John P. Burns：Interest in Politics in Hong Kong

【明報文章】On September 20, 2023, the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at CUHK reported a significant decline in interest in politics among Hong Kong people. 62.9% of respondents reported that they were not very interested or not interested at all in politics, a decline of 7.4%. The survey also found 84.7% of respondents rarely or never used social media such as Facebook to discuss politics, an increase of 8.8% (an increase of 17.1% of those who say that they now never do). Citizens also rarely express their views to district councillors or Legco members (seldom and never 94.6% in 2022 and 92.9% in 2023). NGOs as a conduit to authority fared little better as did direct contact to officials. Only the elite, about 5%, contact our politicians or government officials directly to express their opinions, unchanged from 2022 to 2023.

The survey reveals that citizens in increasing numbers perceive that government officials do not care about their views (55% up from 47% in 2022) and that they have no say in government policies (51.9% up from 43% in 2022). The poll also records an increase in the much smaller numbers who perceive that government does listen and that they do have a say (now 16% and 25% respectively), signaling increasing polarization. Hong Kongers generally perceive that our local political parties can neither hold the government to account nor represent a diversity of citizens’ opinions. The findings taken together paint a depressing picture.

‘Politics’ concerns the exercise and distribution of power. Basically who gets what, when, and how. The wealthy in Hong Kong have always been politically active, advancing and defending their interests where the stakes are huge. Their power is reflected in our political institutions, for example, in functional constituencies in Legco. The polls mostly focus on the rest of us. They seem to say that many of the rest of us are increasingly turning away from the rough and tumble of exercising power.

These results need context. First, trust in government, although recently rising, is still relatively low (less than 30% in one March 2023 survey trust the government. Moreover, in recent months the popularity of the government has also declined. If we take a longer view it is clear that Hong Kongers have for long valued freedom and prosperity more than democracy. Since 2020, however, Hong Kongers appear to value freedom, prosperity and security and the rule of law in equal measure, indicating some success for authority’s campaigns to implement the NSL. Democracy, perhaps a proxy for participation in politics, lags relatively far behind. Other polls also reveal a polarized Hong Kong on these issues.

Second, central and local authorities have imposed a new political system in Hong Kong that severely restricts formal political participation in Legco and district councils. Hongkongers understand this. Of what use is politics for the average person in the new setup? they may be asking. Hong Kong’s new executive-led system also reduces the autonomy of Legco. May Legco members on their own now vote against the budget? May Legco on its own set up select committees to investigate the government and hold it to account? Previously both were possible. Do these actions now need the approval or instruction from the central authorities relayed to members through the office of the Chief Executive? It would appear so. Another reason citizens may perceive that local political parties and contacting officially selected politicians to be relatively worthless. A rational perception, you could argue.

Third, it is not surprising that Hong Kongers perceive that using social media to express political views carries considerable risk. Authorities continue to arrest citizens for their social media posts. Still, pro-establishment figures are avid producers of content and consumers of social media. This indicates again the polarization of Hong Kongers. Remember that pan-democratic supporters among our citizens regularly polled at least 40%, often more.

Fourth, central and local authorities continue to campaign against the vaguely defined ‘soft resistance’ in ideology, culture, education, and the media, warning ominously that unidentified anti-China forces are trying to make a comeback. No specifics. Stay away from politics, it’s too risky, many may be saying.

Academics described Hong Kongers in the 1970s and 1980s as politically apathetic and unwilling to engage in politics, valuing the pursuit of family-centered economic benefits (Lau Siukai’s ‘utilitarianistic familism’). This view overlooked informal political activism and mobilization that has long been a part of Hong Kong political culture. In the 1980s and 1990s authorities expanded formal political participation eventually even in Legco a trend that continued post 1997.

Most of us in Hong Kong are citizens of China. Citizenship requires our active and informed participation. Our political institutions provide formal channels for participation, such as through elections of Legco and district council members. When citizens perceive that these formal channels fail to consider their interests, whether these be livelihood issues or democratic and accountable government, citizens go outside these channels to speak to authority. Hong Kong has a long history of political activism and protest.

With much more limited formal channels for participation, will Hong Kongers turn to protest as they have in the past? Officials are making this option much more difficult. The right to protest and demonstration is guaranteed in the Basic Law, but the exercise of this guarantee depends on what happens on the street, in practice. So far, authorities have strictly limited citizens’ ability to organize protests using tools such as the law, administrative procedures and intimidation.

Of course, dissatisfied citizens in Hong Kong may leave. Since 2020 tens of thousands of Hong Kongers have emigrated. Since 2020 Hong Kong has also welcomed thousands of mainlanders. Polls indicate that those mainland born are more confident in Hong Kong’s future and more positive about their life in Hong Kong than native born Hong Kongers. They may also have a different understanding of their political rights than do native born Hong Kongers. The PRC Constitution and the Basic Law ‘guarantee’ citizens’ rights using exactly the same language, undoubtedly with different meanings. Officials welcome this informal ‘renewal’ of Hong Kong’s population. It undoubtedly makes their life easier.

Authorities have launched a multi-pronged campaign to change Hong Kong’s political culture. It consists of patriotic education and activities in schools, silencing opposition politicians, and shuttering opposition media. Dumbing down people’s expectations of participating in politics is part of the strategy. Authorities apparently perceive that once the genie of political participation, a defining characteristic of citizenship, is let loose it can be stuffed back in the box and they are working overtime to do precisely that. As we have seen the poll results quoted above indicate some official success.

It is in this context that the Democratic Party has apparently decided to field candidates for the upcoming new-look district council. If they succeed (that is, pass official vetting) then in the words of Lau Siu Kai, they may become ‘recognized patriots’. Apparently patriotism is less about what we feel and more about official recognition and approval of our behavior.

Authorities are keen to accurately identify friends and enemies in Hong Kong. That is what united front work is all about. This focus does not particularly value social cohesion, although that would be nice. We are still waiting to see how much diversity of opinion authorities will tolerate. Hopefully more and not less. Stability in Hong Kong depends on it.

Emeritus Professor and Honorary Professor of the University of Hong Kong

[John P. Burns]