Emil Avdaliani：Shifting Eurasian Geopolitics: New Age in Iran-Russia Relations

【明報文章】The expanding ties between Moscow and Tehran reflect shifting geopolitical perspectives in the two capitals: both Russia and Iran have become more Asia-looking. The two are also motivated by their shared resistance to the collective West and especially the United States, which pushed their partnership to an unprecedented level, surpassing previous interactions.

A major boost to the unofficial alliance was the beginning of the war in Ukraine in February 2022. Tehran sensed Moscow’s growing need for trade, political support and, most importantly, military support.

The recent media reports indicate that the Islamic Republic may have bolstered its cooperation with Russia by allegedly providing ballistic missiles to the northern neighbor. Those are potent surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, the bulk of which could be from the Fateh-110 series with a range of 300-700 km.

Whether true or not the bilateral security and military cooperation between Tehran and Moscow has been expanding from earlier this year. On January 24 by Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, and his Iranian counterpart, IRGC Rear Admiral Ali-Akbar Ahmadian, spoke about the establishment of a novel type of military cooperation between the two nations.

Historically, Iran has been cautious about transferring ballistic missiles to Russia, fearing repercussions not only from the U.S. but also from European countries. However, with the expiration of the UN arms embargo on Iran in October 2023, Iran is now legally permitted to supply these missiles, making any sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missile exports a matter of voluntary adherence.

A major turning point was the conflict in Gaza with the U.S. implicitly supporting Israel and Iran increasing pressure on Washington across the region. This left little room for a potential partial rapprochement between Tehran and Washington some signs of which were seen in late 2023 when negotiations via third parties such as Oman and Jordan were held.

Practical necessities also play a role. Previously, Iran might not have seen substantial benefits in providing Russia with ballistic missiles. However, with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and potential missile shortages, Moscow could be more inclined to meet Iran’s demands for advanced technology that it had previously withheld.

But the alleged transfer of ballistic missiles is just a piece in the broadening Iran-Russia military cooperation which includes the supply of munitions, artillery shells, and drones to Russia, along with plans to establish a factory in Russia for producing Iranian-style drones. Furthermore, Iranian media have reported the arrival of Yak-130 combat trainer aircraft for operational use and the potential deployment of a new Iranian kamikaze drone, Shahed-101 (and its modified version, Shaheed-107), which recently have been used against U.S. military bases in the Middle East.

Not all goes well, however. For instance, despite announcements of finalized deals for Russian Su-35 fighter jets and Mi-28 attack helicopters, Iranian officials later indicated that these deals had not been concluded. There is still lingering mistrust in Tehran and Moscow regarding the scope of intelligence and military cooperation. The two countries have an array of issues where they disagree from Syria to the South Caucasus. Russia is still also not fully on board of Iran gaining a nuclear capability, though some signs of Moscow approving of such a scenario have emerged recently.

The military collaboration is part of a wider framework of cooperation, including a recently-signed free trade agreement between the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union and Iran as well as the upcoming completion of a comprehensive interstate agreement. The latter, likely to replace a 10-year deal signed in 2001, will aim for a 20-year period and broader military, economic, and political cooperation. This however does not mean that an official alliance will be signed. The two countries will likely prefer a more flexible partnership allowing for greater maneuverability on the international stage.

In the economic realm too, the level of cooperation might not have been fully reflective of pledges the officials of the two countries often claim. For instance, bilateral trade in 2023 decreased by some 17 percent in comparison with what was recorded a year earlier and stood at $5 billion. This could signal a slight reversal in Russia’s plans to substitute its declining commercial ties with the West with trade in Asia and Middle East.

Nevertheless, the partnership between Iran and Russia still enjoys an enduring momentum. It aligns with both nations’ long-term strategic visions such as an opposition to the West and the pursuit of a multipolar world order. In short, as long as the confrontation with the West continues, Russia and Iran will be increasingly pushed to expand bilateral cooperation.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia.

[Emil Avdaliani]